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FOREWORD
IN BANC PRACTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT, 1989-93
Jon 0. Newman*
This is my third (and likely last) five-year report on in
banc practice in the Second Circuit.1 The salient characteristic
of our in banc practice during 1989-93 is the continuation of an
extremely low rate of rehearings in banc. In those five years
the Second Circuit reheard in banc only 6 cases, an average of
1.2 cases per year. This figure is considerably lower than the
average of 7.65 cases per year for all the federal courts of appeals.'
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
1 See Jon 0. Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit, 1984-1988, 55
BROOK. L. REv. 355 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Foreword]; Jon 0. Newman, In Banc
Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 365
(1984) [hereinafter 1984 Foreword].
Preparation of these five-year reports. on our Court's in banc practice has been
substantially facilitated by the filing system used by my efficient secretary of
twenty-two years, Jeanne Ostapkevich. During my fifteen years on the Court of
Appeals, she has maintained a separate file drawer of all cases that have involved
all members of the Court-those in which rehearing in banc was ordered, those in
which a poll for in banc rehearing was requested (whether or not successful), and
those in which panel opinions were circulated to the full Court prior to filing. The
availability of these files has made it possible to readily survey our in bane
practice. Though in banc opinions and circulations to the full court (where noted
in the opinion) could be identified through computer-assisted legal research, the
requests for in banc polling could otherwise be identified only by laboriously
examining all the unpublished orders denying rehearing in bane to see in which
instances a poll had been requested.
2 During the past five statistical years (ending June 30), the pattern of in
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During the fifteen-year period between 1979 to 1993 the
Second Circuit reheard 19 cases in banc, an average of 1.27 per
year. Although a combination of fortuitous circumstances
resulted in the Circuit hearing five cases in banc in 1988
alone,3 the pattern for the latest five-year interval bears out
both the assertion in my previous report that the 1988 figure
was unusual and my prediction that "the number of in bancs
per year will remain low."4
This five-year update will review the in banc cases from
1989 to 1993, consider some special issues that arise when
voting is close on in banc cases, and hazard some views about
the future of in banc practice. The "ground rules" of in banc
practice are fully set forth in my 1984 Foreword5 and will not
be repeated here.
bancs among the circuits was as follows:
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total
D.C. Circuit 12 1 7 1 4 25
First Circuit 5 4 5 2 6 22
Second Circuit 0 0 0 1 2 3
Third Circuit 4 2 2 6 4 18
Fourth Circuit 11 13 9 11 9 53
Fifth Circuit 5 10 8 18 7 48
Sixth Circuit 7 4 6 1 12 30
Seventh Circuit 10 7 15 9 5 46
Eighth Circuit 14 7 15 6 14 56
Ninth Circuit 7 6 8 15 13 49
Tenth Circuit 17 19 10 11 5 62
Eleventh Circuit 7 12 4 13 11 47
All Circuits 99 85 89 94 92 459
Figures derived from data supplied by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts ("AO").
There is a discrepancy between the three in bancs reported by the AO figures
and the six in bancs discussed in this Article. United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d
909 (2d Cir. 1993) (in banc), was reheard in calendar year 1993, but decided after
the statistical year ended; Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (in
banc), was probably not counted by the AO since the in banc court left the case
for ultimate resolution by the panel; there appears to be no reason why United
States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (in banc), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1759 (1992) was not counted by the AO in either 1990 or 1991.
See 1989 Foreword, supra note 1, at 368.
See 1989 Foreword, supra note 1, at 357.
See 1984 Foreword, supra note 1, at 366-71.
[Vol. 60: 491
FOREWORD
I. IN BANC PRACTICE
The six cases reheard in banc by the Second Circuit in the
past five years, listed in the order of their in banc rehearing
dates, are United States v. MacDonald (1990),6 United States
v. Chestman (1991), 7 Asherman v. Meachum (1992),' Bellamy
v. Cogdell (1992), 9 In re Extradition of McMullen (1993),"o
and United States v. DiNapoli (1993)." As this list shows, no
cases were reheard in banc in 1989, and either one or two were
reheard in each of the subsequent years. Since February 2,
1993, when DiNapoli was reheard, the Second Circuit has not
held an in banc reargument.
During the same five-year period, the Circuit conducted an
in banc poll in ten additional cases, all of which failed to gain
majority support for in banc rehearing. In eleven cases, panel
opinions were circulated to all active judges prior to filing.
A. Appeals Reheard in Banc
The issue in the first in banc case heard during the 1989-
93 period, United States v. MacDonald, was whether a war-
rantless entry into private premises was justified by the exi-
gent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's war-
rant requirement. At the trial level, the district court found
that exigent circumstances had existed; a divided panel re-
versed the conviction; 2 and, by a 9-to-3 vote, the in banc
court rejected the panel's ruling and reinstated the judgment of
conviction. 3
Writing for the majority, Judge Altimari reviewed the
circumstances of the undercover narcotics operation. An under-
cover agent had been admitted to an apartment and had pur-
r 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (in banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991).
7 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (in banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
8 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (in banc).
9 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992) (in banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1383 (1993).
'0 989 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 301 (1993).
'1 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993) (in banc).
'2 United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated sub nom
United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (in banc), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1119 (1991).
13 At the time that MacDonald was argued, the Second Circuit had 12 active
judges of its authorized complement of 13.
1994]
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chased marijuana there. While inside the apartment, the agent
had observed large quantities of cocaine and marijuana, along
with two weapons. The agent left and within ten minutes re-
turned with other agents. After the agents knocked on the door
and announced their presence, they heard the sound of "shuf-
fling feet,"14 and received a radio communication from other
agents who observed occupants of the apartment trying to
escape from a window. At that point the agents made a forced
entry. The in banc majority upheld the district court's finding
of exigent circumstances, rejecting the claim that the officers'
lawful conduct in knocking and announcing their presence had
improperly created the exigent circumstances relied on for the
warrantless entry. Judge Kearse dissented in an opinion joined
by then-Chief Judge Oakes and Judge Feinberg. 5
MacDonald was a fact-specific case, a circumstance that
normally weighs against in banc consideration. Because the
fact pattern was one likely to recur in numerous cases, howev-
er, it was considered appropriate for the entire in banc court to
establish the approach that would be followed in assessing the
existence of exigent circumstances for warrantless entry in
undercover narcotics operations.
United States v. Chestman confronted the Second Circuit
with a dispute concerning the scope of insider trading liabili-
ty.' The case concerned a stockbroker, Robert Chestman, who
had bought shares of Waldbaum, Inc., a publicly traded corpo-
ration that owned a large supermarket chain, just prior to the
public announcement of a tender offer. The claim of insider
trading was based on the following circumstances. Two days
before the tender offer, the president of Waldbaum told his
sister of the transaction; the sister told her daughter; the
daughter told her husband (the president's nephew-in-law); the
husband called his broker, Chestman. He told Chestman that
he had "'some definite, some accurate information' that
Waldbaum was about to be sold at a 'substantially higher'
price than its market value."7 Chestman then proceeded to
buy Waldbaum shares for himself and his clients.
14 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768.
15 Id. at 773 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
16 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (in banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
17 Id. at 555.
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Chestman was convicted of violating Rule 14e-3(a)5 and
Rule 10b-5 issued pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,19 the mail fraud statute," and the perjury statute.21
The panel reversed the convictions on all counts. 2 The in
banc court reheard the case as it pertained to the Rule 14e-
3(a), Rule 10b-5 and mail fraud convictions. The Rule 14e-3(a)
convictions were affirmed by a vote of ten-to-one. 3 The Rule
10b-5 and mail fraud convictions were reversed by a vote of
six-to-five. Judge Meskill's majority opinion held that
Chestman's conduct, although violative of the tender offer rule,
did not render him liable for a Rule 10b-5 or mail fraud convic-
tion because he was neither an aider or abettor of a person
who had misappropriated information nor a tippee of a person
who had breached a fiduciary duty.24
Judge Winter dissented from the Rule 10b-5 and mail
fraud reversals, in an opinion joined by then-Chief Judge
Oakes and Judges Kearse, McLaughlin and myself.2 Judge
Mahoney joined Judge Meskill in reversing the Rule 10b-5 and
mail fraud convictions, but dissented from the affirmance of
the Rule 14e-3(a) conviction.2"
Chestman resolved an important issue of insider trading in
the context of information relayed among family members. It
18 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1994) (dealing with transactions in securities based
on nonpublic information).
19 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994) (dealing with the use of deceptive devices in
connection with security transactions).
20 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (makes mail fraud punishable by
$1000 fine, imprisonment of not more than five years, or both).
21 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988) (makes perjury punishable by $2000 fine, impris-
onment of not more than five years, or both).
22 United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990).
' The in bane court that heard oral argument consisted of 12 judges, since
Judge Walker, who had presided at Chestman's trial as a district judge, recused
himself. After oral argument, Judge Feinberg took senior status, a circumstance
that rendered him no longer eligible to participate in further consideration of an
in banc rehearing of a case on which he was not a member of the original panel.
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 554 n.*. See also 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988)
("A court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service.");
United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685 (1960) (a circuit judge
who has retired is ineligible to participate in decision of case on rehearing in
banc, even where he took part in original three-judge hearing or where he was
not yet retired when in banc hearing was originally ordered).
24 Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571.
22 Id. (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21 Id. at 583 (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1994]
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was clearly an appropriate case for in bane rehearing in a
court that handles a considerable amount of both criminal and
civil securities litigation.
Asherman v. Meachum concerned a self-incrimination
challenge to administrative action taken by state prison offi-
cials." They had terminated the supervised home release of a
sentenced prisoner because he had refused to answer questions
about his crime at a scheduled post-conviction psychiatric eval-
uation. The district court sustained his challenge to the ad-
verse state action, and a panel affirmed by summary order."
The in banc court rejected Asherman's self-incrimination
challenge by a vote of ten-to-three. Writing for the majority,
I held that the psychiatric inquiry concerning Asherman's
crime was relevant to prison officials' responsibilities in admin-
istering the supervised home release program and that the
officials were entitled "to take adverse action against those
whose refusal to answer impedes the discharges of those re-
sponsibilities."" Judges Lumbard and Cardamone wrote sepa-
rate dissenting opinions, with then-Chief Judge Oakes
concurring in Judge Cardamone's opinion.31
The case merited in banc review since it concerned a re-
curring and important issue as to public officials' ability to
take administrative action when confronted by a refusal to
answer a question relevant to the officials' responsibilities.
Asherman also divided the in banc court on a procedural
issue relevant to in banc practice. After rejecting the self-in-
crimination challenge, the court left the remaining issues in
the case for consideration by the original panel.32 The majori-
ty opinion noted that occasionally the court had granted in
banc rehearing limited to one or more specified issues and
reasoned that the same authority justified returning unre-
solved issues to the original panel.33 Ten members of the
27 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (in banc).
28 Asherman v. Meachum, 923 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1990), aff'd, 957 F.2d 978 (2d
Cir. 1992) (in banc).
29 The in banc court consisted of the twelve active judges of the Court plus
Judge Lumbard, a senior judge who had been a member of the original panel.
20 957 F.2d at 982.
3' Id. at 985 (Cardamone J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 984.
Id. at 983-84.
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court supported this view, including the three judges who had
dissented on the merits of the case.34 Judge Miner, writing for
himself and for Judges Pratt and Altimari, expressed the view
that once the in banc court voted to rehear the case without re-
striction as to issues, it should be obliged to decide the entire
case.
35
Bellamy v. Cogdell concerned the circumstances under
which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will be decid-
ed by application of a per se rule that the defendant suffered
prejudice from counsel's failures.3" In Bellamy, the defendant
had been convicted in state court. At trial, defendant's counsel
failed to fulfill his assurance to the court that he would not try
the case but would only assist another lawyer whose services
he would obtain. At the same time, trial counsel was facing
disciplinary proceedings before the New York State Appellate
Division and the trial counsel's lawyer in that matter had told
the court that his client was incompetent by reason of ill
health to participate in the disciplinary proceedings.
A divided panel reversed the district court's denial of a
writ of habeas corpus, holding instead that the per se rule was
applicable and that Bellamy had been denied the effective
assistance of counsel.38 The in banc court upheld the district
court's denial of habeas corpus relief by a vote of seven-to-
six.39 Writing for the majority, Judge Altimari ruled that the
per se approach was inapplicable to the facts of Bellamy's case.
He noted that the per se approach had previously been applied
only when counsel was unlicensed or was implicated in the
defendant's crimes.40 Judge Feinberg dissented in an opinion
joined by Judges Oakes, Kearse, Cardamone, Winter and me.
The case turned significantly on its precise facts, prompt-
ing Judge Feinberg to begin his dissent by expressing the view
" Id. at 985 (Lumbard, J., dissenting in part); id. at 991 n.3 (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting).
" Asherman, 957 F.2d at 984-85 (Miner, J., concurring).
31 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992) (in banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1383 (1993).
3 See id. at 304.
38 Bellamy v. Cogdell, 952 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.
1992) (in banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1383 (1993).
"' The in banc court consisted of twelve active judges (there was one vacancy)
plus Senior Judge Feinberg, who had participated in the panel decision.
'o 974 F.2d at 306 (citing United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990)
and United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1984)).
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that the case was inappropriate for in banc consideration.41
The majority evidently believed it was important to narrow the
circumstances under which the per se approach was applicable
to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In re Extradition of McMullen presented the issue of
whether a supplementary treaty that retroactively expanded
the coverage of a prior extradition treaty was an unconstitu-
tional bill of attainder.4 ' A district court had granted a writ of
habeas corpus,43 and a divided panel had affirmed." The in
banc court reversed by a vote of ten-to-two.45
Writing for the majority, Judge Miner ruled that extradi-
tion was not punishment that implicated the Bill of Attainder
Clause,46 and rejected McMullen's separation of powers con-
tention.47 Judge Altimari dissented in an opinion joined by
Judge Timbers.48
Though the case presented a rarely litigated issue, it in-
volved a matter of major importance, bearing on the United
States's international obligations. The importance of the case
made it appropriate for in banc consideration.
United States v. DiNapoli concerned a narrow point of
evidence arising under Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.49 Rule 804(b)(1) provides that testimony given by a
currently unavailable witness at a prior hearing is not exclud-
ed by the hearsay rule if "the party against whom the testimo-
ny is now offered.., had an opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examina-
tion."0 The issue presented was whether, at the grand jury
examination of two witnesses, the prosecution had had the
requisite "similar motive" to develop their testimony, compared
41 974 F.2d at 309-10 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
42 989 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 301 (1993).
' In re Extradition of McMullen, 769 F. Supp. 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 989
F.2d 603 (2d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 301 (1993).
14 McMullen v. United States, 953 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd, 989 F.2d 603
(2d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 301 (1993).
" The in banc court consisted of eleven active judges (there were two vacan-
cies) plus Senior Judge Timbers, who had been a member of the panel.
" 989 F.2d at 611-13.
4 Id. at 613-14.
41 Id. at 614 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
4' 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993) (in banc).
50 FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(1).
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to its motive at a subsequent trial at which the same witnesses
were unavailable. The trial court had rejected the defendants'
attempt to introduce the witnesses' grand jury testimony at
trial, and the defendants, including Anthony Salerno, the lead
defendant, were convicted.
The case then followed a protracted course.5' A Second
Circuit panel initially reversed the convictions on the ground
that the "similar motive" requirement of Rule 804(b)(1) was
inapplicable to a case in which the government had the power
to confer immunity on the witnesses.52 The Supreme Court
reversed, ruling that the "similar motive" requirement was
applicable in every case and remanding for consideration
whether the facts of DiNapoli satisfied that requirement. 3 On
remand, the panel ruled that the "similar motive" requirement
had been satisfied and again reversed the convictions. 4
By a vote of eight-to-three, the in banc court ruled that the
"similar motive" requirement had not been satisfied.5 Writing
for the majority, I rejected both the defendants' contention that
the prosecution's motives at a grand jury proceeding and at
trial are always similar and the government's contention that
the prosecution's motives at the two proceedings are always
different. Instead, the majority asked whether in this case the
party opposing the offered testimony "had at a prior proceeding
an interest of substantially similar intensity to prove (or dis-
prove) the same side of a substantially similar issue." 6 The
majority concluded that similarity of motive was not shown in
this case. Judge Pratt dissented in an opinion joined by Judges
Miner and Altimari.57
The case involved a fairly narrow point of law, but was
deemed appropriate for in banc consideration because the issue
had "potentially broad implications for the administration of
criminal justice.""
51 The litigation outlived the lead defendant, Anthony Salerno. See DiNapoli, 8
F.3d at 911 n.2.
52 United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991).
United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992).
" United States v. Salerno, 974F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1992).
" The in banc court consisted of the eleven active members of the Court (there
were two vacancies).
" DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914-15.
17 Id. at 915 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 910.
1994]
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B. Procedural Issues in In Banc Rehearings
The close division in some of the in banc cases reheard in
the past five years has prompted consideration of issues that
arise when the in banc court consists of an even number of
judges who are evenly divided. Though that circumstance did
not occur in any of the six cases reheard in the past five years,
it was a possibility of sufficient likelihood to have engaged the
attention of some members of the court.
The equal division of an in banc court poses three issues:
First, does the equal division affirm the judgment of the dis-
trict court or the judgment of the panel whose decision is being
reheard? Second, should opinions be written as to the issue on
which the in bane court is equally divided? Third, does an
affirmance by an equally divided vote have precedential effect?
In three prior in banc cases, Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 9
Farrand Optical Co. v. United States," and Drake Bakeries,
Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery & Confectionery Workers
International,6 the Second Circuit ruled that the equal divi-
sion of an in banc court results in affirmance of the judgment
of the district court.62 This appears to be the practice in some
other circuits as well.63 The in banc equal-division practice of
these courts of appeals follows Supreme Court practice.'
On the issue of whether opinions should be written in
cases of equal division, the practice of the Supreme Court is to
withhold opinions when the justices are equally divided, issu-
ing only a brief per curiam opinion announcing the judgment of
the Court.65 The Supreme Court's rationale for not issuing
opinions appears to be that an affirmance by an equal division
is not accorded precedential weight.66 Even if equal-division in
59 340 F.2d 311, 312 (2d Cir. 1965) (in banc), cert. dismissed, Holt v. Alleghany
Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966).
60 317 F.2d 875, 883 (2d Cir. 1963) (in bane).
61 294 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1961) (in banc), aff'd, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
62 In Drake Bakeries, however, the court noted that Judges Lumbard and
Friendly believed that the equal division of the in bane court left the opinion of
the panel in force. Id. at 400.
' See, e.g., Penthouse Int'l v. McAuliffe, 717 F.2d 517, 517 (11th Cir. 1983) (in
banc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1108 (1984); Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 712
F.2d 1235, 1236 (8th Cir. 1983) (in banc), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984).
64 See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1972).
65 See, e.g., Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531 (1971).
66 See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264 (1960) (opinion of
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bane judgments in courts of appeals lack precedential effect, it
does not necessarily follow that these courts should withhold
opinions in such cases. The opinions of an equally divided
court of appeals might well be useful to the Supreme Court in
deciding whether to grant certiorari, a concern obviously ab-
sent when the Supreme Court itself is equally divided.
In the Second Circuit, opinions were not issued in the
three prior equal-division in banc cases, Alleghany, Farrand
Optical, and Drake Bakeries. That practice has been followed
in some circuits,67 but rejected by others." As to whether an
in banc affirmance by an equally divided vote has precedential
effect, the Second Circuit has not expressed a view. Other
circuits have taken the seemingly sensible approach that such
a disposition lacks precedential effect.69
C. In Banc Polling
In the past five years, of the hundreds of suggestions for
rehearing in banc that routinely accompany petitions for panel
rehearing, there were only twenty requests from an active
judge or panel member to poll the active judges on whether a
case should be reheard in bane. The request for an in bane poll
was withdrawn in four cases after the panel opinion was
amended, leaving sixteen cases in which a vote was taken. Of
those sixteen requests, only six received the majority vote of
the active judges needed to rehear the case in bane. Four of
the ten cases that failed to garner a majority vote yielded opin-
ions dissenting from the denial of the rehearing in banc.0
Brennan, J.). Justice Brennan also notes the following 'salutary" effect of the prac-
tice: it "prevent[s] the identification of the Justices holding the differing views as
to the issue, and this may well enable the next case presenting it to be ap-
proached with less commitment." Id.
"' See Hill v. Lockhart, 764 F.2d 1279 (8th Cir. 1984) (in banc), aff'd, 474 U.S.
52 (1985); Penthouse Int'l, 717 F.2d at 517.
"' See Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union v. Smith, 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (in banc); United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (in banc);
Roesch, 712 F.2d at 1236; Herweg v. Ray, 619 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1980) (in banc),
rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 265 (1982); McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (in banc) (equal division on one issue).
" See, e.g., Penthouse Int'l, 717 F.2d at 517; Roesch, 712 F.2d at 1236;
Henderson v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 584 F.2d 115, 116 (5th Cir. 1978) (in
banc), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979).
" See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 395 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman,
1994]
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The low number of in banc polls continues a pattern re-
flected in prior years. The number of in banc polls that were
voted upon fell from twenty-five during the 1979 to 1983 peri-
od to nineteen during the 1984 to 1988 period to the sixteen
during the 1989 to 1993 period. The number of polls in the
most recent period corresponds to an average of approximately
three polls per year.
During the latter part of the recent five-year period, the
Second Circuit had three vacancies. Because a vacancy is not
counted in the base for calculating a majority of active judges
in an in banc poll,7' it took only six judges (out of ten) to ob-
tain a rehearing in banc in the most recent years, rather than
the seven required when the Court is at its full complement of
thirteen. Nevertheless, the rate of in banc polling declined.
D. In Banc Circulation of Panel Opinions
For various reasons, a panel of the Second Circuit on occa-
sion circulates a proposed opinion to the full court prior to
filing. This occurred eleven times during 1989-93. In all but
one instance, the fact of circulation was noted.72
II. PERSONAL REFLECTION
I continue to believe that the Second Circuit's pattern of
rarely rehearing cases in banc has been a sound policy, well
serving the institutional needs of the court and thereby en-
abling the court to serve the public interest efficiently. I say
this even though I have written three of the four opinions in
the past five years dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 163 (1993);
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576, 587 (2d
Cir. 1991) (Oakes, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc), aff'd in part,
112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) and aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992); New Era Publications
Int'l v. Henry Holt Co., 884 F.2d 659, 662 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing in banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990); In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert Inc., 869 F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing in banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1102 (1989).
71 2D CIR. R. 35.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Cutler, 6 F.3d 67, 73 n.5 (2d Cir. 1993) ("This
opinion has been circulated to the active members of this court prior to filing.").
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and have joined the fourth opinion."v The fact that my pref-
erence for in banc consideration of particular cases was not
shared by a majority of the active judges has not altered my
general agreement with the restrained approach our court has
adopted for in banc practice.
Our approach enables us to use judicial resources efficient-
ly, concentrating our efforts on the prompt hearing and dispo-
sition of cases by panel opinion. It has also contributed signifi-
cantly to the high level of collegiality that this court enjoys. v4
As the membership of the court changes, there is always
the possibility that the pattern of rare in bancs might change.
My guess, however, is that the pattern that I have observed
during the past fifteen years-years in which we have reheard
only nineteen cases in banc-will likely continue. It may fluc-
tuate a bit, but those coming onto the court, including the
three new judges confirmed this year, will find a rather firmly
established tradition. I hope that they-and all who observe
the work of this Court-will appreciate the benefits that our
practice of infrequent in bancs has conferred upon our institu-
tion.
See supra note 70.
7 I have previously discussed these considerations, and will not repeat them
here. See 1989 Foreword, supra note 1, at 369-70.
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